Prager Tagblatt
- Unexpected Result of the Strike Vote
- Strategy of Exhaustion
- Catastrophic Consequences for Union and Workers
The Prague German-language daily gave prominence to the British coal dispute. A short report, based on a statement by the miners' leader A.J. Cook, said the miners had rejected the government's proposals by a large majority in their vote. A longer item argued that although only a minority of miners wanted to fight on, British union rules, with no secret ballot and a weak executive, kept a hopeless strike from being called off at once, with catastrophic consequences for the union and the workers. On domestic politics, the commentary 'Strategy of Exhaustion' asked whether anyone could seriously deny that the method it described had worked both with Czech parties and in bringing the German bourgeois parties into the government majority.
Translation
Unexpected Result of the Strike Vote
According to a statement by Cook, the miners in their [?] rejected the government's proposals by a large majority.
Strategy of Exhaustion
Does anyone seriously mean to deny that this method has been successfully tried out not only in dealings with Czech parties, but also in winning the German bourgeois parties over to the majority?
Catastrophic Consequences for Union and Workers
Although only a minority of the miners came out in favor of continuing the struggle, the peculiar English trade-union constitution, which knows no secret and partisan strike ballot and gives the executive only insufficient powers, prevents the immediate breaking off of a hopeless strike
Context
Cook and the long coal lockout
A.J. Cook, whose statement the Prague paper relays, was General Secretary of the Miners' Federation of Great Britain. By November 1926 the miners had been out for months: the General Strike had ended in May, but the coal dispute went on as a lockout. In July the Trades Union Congress General Council refused the Federation's request for an embargo on coal movements, though it undertook to provide financial support for the locked-out miners. On 17 August the Federation's delegate conference empowered its executive to reopen negotiations with the coalowners and the government without prior conditions, and on 19 August talks broke down because the owners made clear they would accept only unconditional surrender. The vote reported here therefore came at the end of a long war of attrition, when government proposals were put to the coalfields district by district.
What the district votes decided and how the strike ended
The district ballots rejected the government's offer, and the Federation then turned at once to district-level bargaining. Its delegate conference met on Friday, 19 November 1926, the date of this issue, to consider the results. The Spectator recorded 460,806 votes for rejecting the government's offer and a majority of 147,606 against acceptance. The conference finally adopted a resolution from South Wales advising the districts to open negotiations with the coalowners immediately. In the Spectator's judgment, the district votes had prevented any national framework from being saved in the coal settlement. Between 27 and 30 November the miners went back to work on lower pay and longer hours. The Prague paper's report of a large majority for rejection matches the British tally. Its other claim, that only a minority wanted to carry on fighting, is a reading of the result rather than a vote count: rejecting the offer did not mean continuing the strike, since the Federation itself moved straight to settlements district by district.
Secret strike ballots in British debate after 1926
The Prague paper blamed the miners' plight on a British union constitution with no secret strike ballot, and the same idea was debated in London right after the General Strike. Lord Chancellor George Cave proposed that ballots and compulsory arbitration should in future come before any stoppage. The Minister of Labour, Arthur Steel-Maitland, told colleagues that the belief that ballots would avert stoppages was 'generally a delusion'. Employers also opposed the secret ballot, and the Cabinet committee concluded that it could not recommend a change the employers flatly rejected. Ballots were therefore left out of the 1927 Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act on the employers' advice. The 1927 Act was repealed under the Attlee government in 1946. The question came back much later: Clause 2 of the Conservative government's 2015 Trade Union Bill imposed a 50% ballot requirement for all strikes, a measure the historian Adrian Williamson set beside the proposals that had been rejected in 1927.
Coalition-building in Czechoslovakia and the Slovak People's Party
The commentary 'Strategy of Exhaustion' takes it as settled that a method of patient pressure had already worked with Czech parties and had brought the German bourgeois parties into the government majority. The partner that coalition-builders still had to win was the Slovak People's Party led by Andrej Hlinka, who had argued for Slovak autonomy both in the National Assembly and at the Paris Peace Conference. At the height of its popularity in 1925 the party polled 32 percent of the Slovak vote. Hlinka's charisma, temperament, stubbornness and sharp tongue made him a difficult negotiating partner. In 1927 Prague made a modest concession by granting Slovakia the status of a separate province, and the Slovak Populists joined the central government, with Jozef Tiso and Marko Gazlik appointed to the cabinet. That outcome, a few months after this issue appeared, shows the widening of the majority that the editorial describes going on to include the Slovak autonomists.
Original
Unerwartetes Ergebnis der Streikabstimmung.
Nach einer Erklärung Cooks haben die Bergarbeiter bei ihrer [?] die Regierungsvorschläge mit großer Mehrheit abgelehnt.
Ermattungs-Strategie.
Will man ernstlich leugnen, daß diese Methode nicht nur im Verkehr mit tschechischen Parteien, sondern auch bei der Gewinnung der Deutschbürgerlichen für die Mehrheit erfolgreich erprobt worden ist?
Katastrophale Folgen für Gewerkschaft und Arbeiter
Obwohl nur eine Minderheit der Bergarbeiter für die Fortführung des Kampfes eingetreten ist, verhindert die eigentümliche englische Gewerkschaftsverfassung, die keine geheime und parteiische Streikabstimmung kennt und dem Vorstande nur ungenügende Vollmachten gibt, den sofortigen Abbruch eines hoffnungslosen Streikes