Neue Freie Presse
- Count Tisza and the War with Italy.
- The Reduction of the Occupation Troops.
- Serious Situation in Spain.
The Neue Freie Presse of 14 October 1926 led with a Budapest report on the Hungarian Academy of Sciences' edition of Count Stephan Tisza's wartime letters. It quoted Tisza's January 1915 attack on Prince Bülow for failing to defend the Trentino in Rome, described the friendly attitude of Italy's ambassador Avarna and of the Vatican, and broke off in Erzberger's alarmed telegram of 2 May 1915 warning that Cadorna wanted war. Telegrams from Paris reported that General Guillaumat had proposed cutting the French Rhineland army to four divisions but had run into strong objections, and that Spain's Liberals had protested to Alfonso XIII that Primo de Rivera's planned National Assembly would breach the constitution, leaving the King's throne in danger.
Translation
Count Tisza and the War with Italy.
Vienna, Thursday, 14 October 1926. Count Tisza and the War with Italy. Important reports by Bülow and Erzberger from Rome. From our correspondent. Budapest, 12 October. The collection of Count Stephan Tisza's letters published by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences stands in relation to the literature of war memoirs as the raw print of a photograph stands to the retouched picture. The Hungarian statesman is not thinking of the public when he puts his thoughts on paper; the situation of the day, of the hour, is captured in the white heat of events. Hence the profound effect of these epistolary statements, which represent a piece of living world history. The complicated political, diplomatic and military machinery appears laid bare with all its wheelwork and stripped of its secrets. Count Tisza corresponds in three languages. He writes his confidential communications to Burian in Hungarian; when it is a matter of making his standpoint clear to the German ally, he chooses German, evidently to spare Burian the trouble of a translation. In such cases his letters take the form of diplomatic notes. The letter to Sonnino is in French.
Tisza against territorial cessions to Italy.
It is above all Bülow's activity in Rome that meets with Tisza's sharpest criticism. On 6 January 1915 he writes to Count Berchtold: "The communications made by Herr von Tschirschky on 4 January tear the veil from Prince Bülow's machinations. To mention just one thing: Prince Bülow boasts of having argued with full emphasis against the cession of Trieste; which proves a contrario that he did not do the same with regard to the Trentino. The Italians are, at the worst moment, through his attitude [?] and [?] rules of conduct; he writes that "a wide scope now presents itself for a useful exchange of ideas on Italy's treaty obligations (benevolent neutrality)".
The attitude of Avarna and the Vatican.
Noteworthy is the attitude of the Italian ambassador in Vienna, Avarna, who in those grave days proves himself a friend of the Monarchy. Avarna suggests to Burian that he make representations in Rome about the troop concentrations. Tisza advises that Avarna himself should seek to obtain a reassuring statement from his government. The Vatican, too, is amicably disposed toward the Monarchy. Prince Primate Csernoch is in lively correspondence with the Vatican. His letters, however, are censored by the Italian authorities. Tisza complains about this and offers Csernoch the services of the diplomatic courier. The Archbishop of Kalocsa, Arpad Varady, informs the Hungarian premier about Erzberger's mediating activity at the Vatican. The dispatches signed by Erzberger and Bülow, which the Archbishop passes on to Count Tisza, are among the most interesting documents of that most agitated phase of the year 1915.
Erzberger's urging.
Erzberger reports on 2 May: "The matter stands on a knife's edge. Vienna ministry's assumption that a ministerial crisis is imminent here, mistaken. But even if correct, danger of the hour does not change. Chief of General Staff Cadorna wants war. He considers the disintegration of Austria unstoppable. He therefore wants Italy in good time in the Adriatic [?] [?]
The Reduction of the Occupation Troops.
Paid announcements contained in the editorial section (Little Chronicle, Local Report, Theatre News, Economist) are marked by a preceding E.
The Reduction of the Occupation Troops. Misgivings about General Guillaumat's plan. Telegrams from our correspondents. Paris, 13 October. At a reception for the French press at the Quai d'Orsay this evening it was confirmed that the commander-in-chief of the Rhine Army, General Guillaumat, who is currently in Paris to report, has indeed submitted to the French government a plan for withdrawing part of the French occupation troops, which would reduce the total strength of the occupation army to four divisions. The French government will examine this plan in detail at one of the next cabinet meetings. In well-informed circles, however, it is already being asserted today that Guillaumat's project has met with strong misgivings in the competent quarters here, and that consequently its implementation can hardly be expected for the time being.
Serious Situation in Spain. Protests against the projected National Assembly.
Serious Situation in Spain.
…has met with strong misgivings in the competent quarters here, and that consequently its implementation can hardly be expected for the time being.
Serious Situation in Spain. Protests against the projected National Assembly. Telegram from our correspondent. Paris, 13 October. Copies are circulating in Spain of the letter of protest addressed to the King by the Liberal Party, signed by Romanones and Villanueva, directed against Primo de Rivera's project of a National Assembly and pointing out to the King the breach of the constitution that would result from convening the National Assembly. Judging by Primo de Rivera's latest speeches, he will not give way and will not abandon the plan to convene the National Assembly. The decision rests with the King alone, who already stands in a certain opposition to Primo de Rivera but nevertheless does not have the power to remove him. As a result, the throne is at present in great danger: first from a possible republican uprising, which may proceed from the army, where incitement is spreading ever further; and then from the fact that a later parliament, should the reaction from the left meet with success, could prove against the King the grave breach of the constitution that the convening of the National Assembly would have constituted. The situation is very serious; a decision must be made in October. The present impression is that Alfonso XIII, despite all the danger, will sign the decree convening the National Assembly, since he considers Primo de Rivera strong enough to protect both himself and the King.
Chronicle supplement of the
Context
What Austria-Hungary would and would not cede to Italy in 1915
The Tisza letters quoted by the paper come from the months in which Vienna tried to keep Italy neutral by bargaining over territory. On 8 April 1915 the Italian foreign minister, Sidney Sonnino, sent Austria a draft treaty in eleven articles. On 16 April Austria rejected the Italian demands and repeated that it was prepared to give up only part of the Trentino. Tisza's letter of 6 January 1915, as the correspondent quotes it, already treats the Trentino as the weak point. Tisza read Bülow's boast that he had opposed the cession of Trieste as proof that the German ambassador had not defended the Trentino in the same way. The charge of 'machinations' is Tisza's judgment, and the correspondent adopts it. The documented outcome is narrower: Vienna's limited offer on the Trentino did not satisfy Rome, and the negotiations broke down.
How Erzberger's telegram of 2 May 1915 fits Italy's road to war
In the telegram of 2 May that the article quotes, Erzberger wrote that the matter stood 'on a knife's edge' and that the chief of the general staff, Cadorna, wanted war. By then Italy had already signed the secret Treaty of London with the Triple Entente on 26 April, under which it was to declare war on Germany and Austria-Hungary within a month. On 3 May, the day after Erzberger's telegram, Italy officially revoked the Triple Alliance. Italy declared war on Austria-Hungary on 23 May, and Cadorna commanded the Italian Army in the First Battle of the Isonzo that began in June. Erzberger's mediation through the Vatican, which the Archbishop of Kalocsa relayed to Tisza, was therefore taking place after the government in Rome had already promised the Entente to enter the war.
Why a smaller French army on the Rhine was under discussion in October 1926
The Allied occupation of the Rhineland was meant to give France and Belgium security against any future German attack. After the Locarno Treaties settled Germany's western border in late 1925, the northern occupation zone around Cologne was evacuated in January 1926, and Germany's admission to the League of Nations in 1926 was the treaties' most notable result. The German foreign minister, Gustav Stresemann, aimed to end both reparations and the occupation of the Rhineland. General Guillaumat's plan to cut the occupation army to four divisions, reported here from Paris, came out of this period of rapprochement. France, however, was concerned above all with security against further German aggression. The article does not say who in Paris objected or on what grounds, and that French priority is the likely background to the hesitation. The occupation continued for several more years: the Koblenz zone was evacuated in November 1929, and the occupation ended on 30 June 1930, five years earlier than the Treaty of Versailles had laid down.
What the Liberal protest against Primo de Rivera's National Assembly was about
The Liberal letter signed by Romanones and Villanueva warned Alfonso XIII that convening the National Assembly would breach the constitution. On 14 September 1923 the King had declared his support for Primo de Rivera's coup, and the 1876 constitution was suspended at that point. In December 1925 the dictatorship moved from the Military Directory to the Civil Directory, and with that change Primo de Rivera rejected the return to a parliamentary system he had promised in 1923. The National Assembly he created represented corporate bodies such as the Unión Patriótica, the Church, the army, local governments and economic organisations, rather than individual voters. The correspondent's forecast of an army-led republican rising in 1926 was his own assessment. Over the following years the army's grievances against Primo de Rivera grew and the King stopped supporting the dictatorship. Primo de Rivera resigned in 1930, and the Second Republic was established in 1931.
Original
Graf Tisza und der Krieg mit Italien.
Wien, Donnerstag, den 14. Oktober 1926. Graf Tisza und der Krieg mit Italien. Wichtige Berichte Bülows und Erzbergers aus Rom. Von unserem Korrespondenten. Budapest, 12. Oktober. Die von der ungarischen Akademie der Wissenschaften veröffentlichte Sammlung der Briefe des Grafen Stephan Tisza verhält sich zu der Kriegsmemoirenliteratur wie der Rohabzug einer Photographie zum retuschierten Bilde. Der ungarische Staatsmann denkt nicht an die Oeffentlichkeit, wenn er seine Gedanken zu Papier bringt; die Situation des Tages, der Stunde ist in der Weißglut des Geschehens festgehalten. Daher die tiefe Wirkung dieser brieflichen Kundgebungen, die ein Stück lebendiger Weltgeschichte darstellen. Die komplizierte politische, diplomatische und militärische Maschinerie erscheint mit allem Räderwerk bloßgelegt und ihrer Geheimnisse entkleidet. Graf Tisza korrespondiert in drei Sprachen. Die vertraulichen Mitteilungen an Burian schreibt er ungarisch; wenn es gilt, dem deutschen Bundesgenossen den Standpunkt klarzumachen, wählt er das Deutsche, augenscheinlich um Burian die Mühe einer Uebersetzung zu ersparen. In solchen Fällen haben seine Briefe die Fassung diplomatischer Noten. Der Brief an Sonnino ist französisch. Tisza gegen Gebietsabtretungen an Italien. Es ist vor allem die Tätigkeit Bülows in Rom, welche die schärfste Kritik Tiszas findet. Am 6. Januar 1915 schreibt er dem Grafen Berchtold: " Die am 4. Januar gemachten Mitteilungen Herrn v. Tschirschkys reißen den Schleier von den Machenschaften des Fürsten Bülow. Um nur eines zu erwähnen: Fürst Bülow brüstet sich, gegen das Abtreten von Triest mit vollem Nachdruck eingetreten zu sein; was a contrario beweist, daß er bezüglich des Trentino nicht dasselbe tat. Es werden die Italiener im schlechtesten Moment durch seine Haltung [?] und [?] haltungsmaßregeln; er schreibt, daß sich " nunmehr für einen nützlichen Gedankenaustausch über die Vertragspflichten Italiens (wohlwollende Neutralität) ein weiter Spielraum biete ". Die Haltung Avarnas und des Vatikans. Bemerkenswert ist die Haltung des italienischen Botschafters in Wien, Avarna, der sich in jenen schweren Tagen als ein Freund der Monarchie erweist. Avarna legt Burian nahe, er möge in Rom wegen der Truppenzusammenziehungen vorstellig werden. Tisza erteilt den Rat, daß Avarna selbst von seiner Regierung eine beruhigende Erklärung zu erlangen trachten möge. Auch der Vatikan ist der Monarchie freundschaftlich gesinnt. Fürstprimas Csernoch steht mit dem Vatikan in regem Briefwechsel. Seine Briefschaften werden aber von der italienischen Behörde zensuriert. Tisza beklagt sich darüber und bietet Csernoch die Dienste des diplomatischen Kuriers an. Der Erzbischof von Kalocsa, Arpad Varady, informiert den ungarischen Premier über die Vermittlungstätigkeit Erzbergers im Vatikan. Die von Erzberger und Bülow unterfertigten Depeschen, die der Erzbischof dem Grafen Tisza übermittelt, gehören zu den interessantesten Dokumenten jener aufregendsten Phase des Jahres 1915. Das Drängen Erzbergers. Erzberger berichtet am 2. Mai: " Die Sache steht auf des Messers Schneide. Annahme des Wiener Ministeriums daß hier Ministerkrise bevorstehe, irrig. Aber auch, wenn zutreffend, ändert sich Gefahr der Stunde nicht. Generalstabschef Cadorna will den Krieg. Er hält Auseinanderfall Oesterreichs für unaufhaltbar. Er will daher Italien rechtzeitig in der Adria [?] [?]
Die Herabsetzung der Besatzungstruppen.
Im redaktionellen Teil (Kleine Chronik, Lokalbericht, Theaternachrichten, Economist) enthaltene entgeltliche Mitteilungen sind durch ein vorgesetztes E kenntlich gemacht. Die Herabsetzung der Besatzungstruppen. Bedenken gegen den Plan des Generals Guillaumat. Telegramme unserer Korrespondenten. Paris, 13. Oktober. Bei einem Empfange der französischen Presse am Quai d'Orsay wurde heute abend bestätigt, daß der augenblicklich zur Berichterstattung in Paris weilende Oberbefehlshaber der Rheinarmee General Guillaumat der französischen Regierung tatsächlich einen Plan zur Zurückziehung eines Teiles der französischen Besatzungstruppen unterbreitet hat, der die Gesamtstärke der Okkupationsarmee auf vier Divisionen reduzieren würde. Die französische Regierung wird diesen Plan in einer der nächsten Sitzungen des Kabinetts eingehend prüfen. In gut unterrichteten Kreisen wird jedoch schon heute versichert, daß Guillaumats Projekt an hiesiger zuständiger Stelle auf starke Bedenken gestoßen ist und daß infolgedessen mit seiner Durchführung vorerst kaum gerechnet werden kann. Ernste Lage in Spanien. Proteste gegen die projektierte Nationalversammlung.
Ernste Lage in Spanien.
Stelle auf starke Bedenken gestoßen ist und daß infolgedessen mit seiner Durchführung vorerst kaum gerechnet werden kann. Ernste Lage in Spanien. Proteste gegen die projektierte Nationalversammlung. Telegramm unseres Korrespondenten. Paris, 13. Oktober. In Spanien zirkulieren Abschriften des von der liberalen Partei an den König gerichteten Protestschreibens, das von Romanones und Villanueva unterzeichnet und gegen Primo de Riveras Projekt einer Nationalversammlung gerichtet ist und den König auf den Verfassungsbruch hinweist, der aus der Einberufung der Nationalversammlung entstehen würde. Nach den letzten Reden Primo de Riveras wird dieser nicht nachgeben und von dem Plane der Einberufung der Nationalversammlung nicht abgehen. Die Entscheidung liegt allein beim König, der bereits in einem gewissen Gegensatz zu Primo de Rivera steht, aber doch nicht die Macht hat, ihn abzusetzen. Infolgedessen ist der Thron gegenwärtig sehr gefährdet, und zwar von einem möglichen republikanischen Aufstand, der vom Heere ausgehen kann, dessen Verhetzung immer weiter fortschreitet, dann aber dadurch, daß ein späteres Parlament für den Fall, daß die Linksreaktion von Erfolg begleitet wäre, dem König den schweren Verfassungsbruch, der durch die Einberufung der Nationalversammlung erfolgt wäre, nachweisen könnte. Die Lage ist sehr ernst, eine Entscheidung muß im Oktober erfolgen. Der jetzige Eindruck ist, daß Alfons XIII. trotz aller Gefahr das Einberufungsdekret für die Nationalversammlung unterzeichnen wird, da er Primo de Rivera für stark genug hält, sich und ihn zu schützen. Chronikbeilage der