Prager Tagblatt
- Forbidden Opposition
- Russia Recognizes the American Debt
- The Liquidation of the Seeckt Affair
The Prager Tagblatt of Sunday, 10 October 1926 led with the Soviet party struggle. Its Moscow report said the Politburo had censured Zinoviev and Trotsky, ordered an inquiry by the Central Control Commission and left sanctions to a plenum, while Pravda demanded a public recantation; in Leningrad party cells the Central Committee reportedly won 33,729 votes to the opposition's 320. From London came an interview with the new Soviet envoy Krassin, who offered to recognise the American debts if no European claims were mixed in, but insisted that Moscow could pay foreign debts only if it received credits, citing Belgium as a warning. From Berlin the paper reported that Lieutenant General Heye had succeeded the resigned General von Seeckt as head of the army command, and that Paris saw the cabinet's firmness as a sign of the republic's consolidation.
Translation
Forbidden Opposition
Sunday, 10 October 1926. Forbidden Opposition. The Politburo reprimands Zinoviev and Trotsky, demands submission and threatens sanctions. Moscow, 9 October. The conflict of the Communist parties has entered a decisive stage. On 7 October the opposition undertook organized attacks against the Central Committee at the meeting in Leningrad. Today's papers everywhere report a defeat of the opposition leaders. In all, the opposition appeared at 159 meetings of individual Communist collectives in Leningrad. While the Central Committee received 33,729 votes, a total of 320 voted for the opposition. Pravda is taking an ever sharper stand against the opposition. At the same time, newspaper reports indicate that ever sharper resolutions against the opposition are being passed at Communist meetings in individual factories. The paper demands that the opposition publicly, before the party and the Communist International, admit the error of its recent activity and retract all attacks and slanders against the Central Committee. Without this public step by the opposition, it says, there is no guarantee that such crises will not recur in the future. The party, it says, must do everything to counter such excesses. At the same time, today the Politburo's decisions of 4 and 8 Oc… by the leading representatives of the opposition. The conduct of Trotsky and Zinoviev must be judged particularly severely, since these persons are not only responsible officials of the state and party functionaries but also members of the Central Committee, and as such have the elementary obligation to defend the decisions of the Central Committee. The Politburo therefore instructs the party court and the Central Control Commission to open an investigation into the offences in question, and refers the question of sanctions to a session of the plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission. This decision of 4 October was the reason for the rumours of an understanding between the opposition and the majority, since it had generally been assumed that the opposition would submit to this decision. The Politburo's statement of 8 October shows that even the party leadership had not expected the oppositional campaign to continue. Despite the decision of 4 October, the Central Committee member Zinoviev had…
Russia Recognizes the American Debt
…of the opposition there is no guarantee that such crises will not recur in the future. The party, it says, must do everything to counter such excesses. At the same time, the Politburo's decisions of 4 and 8 October are published today. The decision of 4 October establishes a serious violation of party discipline. The Politburo's statement of 8 October shows that even the party leadership had not expected the oppositional campaign to continue. Despite the decision of 4 October, it says, the Central Committee member Zinoviev had on 7 October again given speeches discrediting the Central Committee, in opposition to it, in the cell of the Putilov Works in Leningrad. Russia Recognizes the American Debt. Statement by Krassin. London, 9 October. The new Soviet envoy in London, Krassin, declared in an interview that the Soviet government was prepared to recognize the American debts and that, as soon as negotiations between the United States and Russia began, they could be brought to a satisfactory conclusion within two weeks. “We would,” said Krassin, “set only one condition, namely that no European claims be mixed into the agreement. We would also expect the same generosity toward us that the United States has shown toward its other debtors. Asked whether he believed that Russia … the most suitable moment for it, and he would not ask Chamberlain to resume such negotiations. Naturally he would work toward negotiating with the British government. The Soviet government had only two interests abroad: 1. peace and 2. obtaining foreign credits. Russia could, it is true, complete its reconstruction even without outside help, but it wanted to move forward faster, and that it could not do without foreign credits. The Soviet government had repeatedly been told that it need only recognize its debts and the credits would then follow automatically. That, however, did not correspond to the facts. One need only…
The Liquidation of the Seeckt Affair
…no European claims be mixed into the agreement. We would also expect the same generosity toward us that the United States has shown toward its other debtors. Asked whether he believed that Russia would offer America an unlimited market for American capital, Krassin replied that in his opinion this would be the case; he did not believe, however, that America had great interest in foreign markets. America did not need them for the time being, but probably only in 25 years, and by then Russia would find itself economically at the same level as America. Krassin denied that he had come to London to obtain credits there. He said that at the moment the un… help complete its reconstruction, but it wanted to move forward faster, and that it could not do without foreign credits. The Soviet government had repeatedly been told that it need only recognize its debts and the credits would then follow automatically. That, however, did not correspond to the facts. One need only look at Belgium, which has recognized all its debts and now needs credits to stabilize its currency, and for this purpose must pledge its railways in order to get at least part of what it needs. Russia's policy consists in linking these two questions: without credits the Soviet government could not commit itself to paying its foreign debts. There was therefore no sense in talking about such conditions. The Liquidation of the Seeckt Affair. Lieutenant General Heye appointed Chief of the Army Command. Great impression in Paris. Berlin, 9 October. The conflict between the former Chief of the Army Command, General von Seeckt, and the Reichswehr Minister has been ended by the Reich President's appointment of Lieutenant General Heye, previously commander of the 1st Division and commander in the eastern Military District I in Königsberg, as Chief of the Army Command in succession to the Colonel General who has resigned. Heye is among the most capable officers of the Reichswehr. During the war he held responsible positions, for instance in 1915 at Ivangorod. He also proved his clear sight when, at the end of the war, on behalf of General Groener, he gave the army commanders of the Western Front an accurate picture of the desperate overall military situation. After the war he administered … the Troop Office and the Personnel Office. Politically, the new Chief of the Army Command has hardly come to the fore at all in recent years. Paris, 9 October. The Reich President's approval of General von Seeckt's resignation made all the stronger an impression here today, since it had been assumed that the Reich President's efforts to keep the general would lead to a rotten compromise. The determination with which the entire Reich cabinet stood behind the Defence Minister, and thereby forced the acceptance of the general's resignation, is regarded here as gratifying proof of the consolidation of the republi-
Context
Why the Politburo treated opposition as a breach of discipline
The headline 'Forbidden Opposition' rests on a rule older than the quarrel it reports: to promote party unity, the 10th Party Congress in 1921 banned factions within the Bolshevik party. The opposition censured in October 1926 was the United Opposition, created that year when Trotsky's Left Opposition merged with the New Opposition led by Zinoviev and Kamenev. In May 1926 Trotsky, Zinoviev and 82 others had signed a declaration denouncing Stalin's leadership. Against this background the Politburo's argument, as the paper relays it, makes sense on its own terms: because Trotsky and Zinoviev sat on the Central Committee, campaigning against its line in party cells such as the Putilov Works counted as a disciplinary offence for the party court and the Central Control Commission rather than as legitimate debate. The lopsided Leningrad tally of 33,729 to 320 reached Prague through the Soviet press, which the paper itself describes as increasingly hostile to the opposition, so it reflects the majority's own account of the meetings.
What became of the opposition after the October decisions
The paper notes that the decision of 4 October had prompted rumours of an understanding, and that the leadership had expected the opposition to submit. Later accounts confirm both pressure and bargaining. In October 1926 Stalin's supporters voted Trotsky out of the Politburo; by then Kamenev and Zinoviev had also been removed from it, and Zinoviev lost his post as head of the Comintern, the body before which Pravda wanted the opposition to recant. Stalin negotiated with the opposition leaders, and many members, accepting the compromise or fearing the consequences of continuing the fight, apologised and recommitted themselves against factionalism. This retreat proved temporary. The group kept agitating into 1927 and was expelled at the Fifteenth Party Congress in December 1927, which declared its views incompatible with party membership. The sanctions this article only threatened were thus carried out in stages over the following fourteen months.
Who Krassin was and why his London statements mattered
Leonid Krasin, whom the paper calls the 'new Soviet envoy', had moved from the Paris embassy to London in 1925 and was an experienced Soviet negotiator with the West: he had negotiated the Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement signed in March 1921. In this interview he tied any settlement of the debts to new credits, which is why he cited Belgium as a country that had recognised its debts and still had to pledge its railways. At the time of his death he was negotiating formal recognition of the Soviet government by Britain and France. The offer itself is reported here only from his own words, and the confident forecasts, a two-week settlement and Soviet economic parity with America within 25 years, are his claims. Krasin died suddenly in London later in 1926, so he could not pursue the initiative further.
Why Seeckt had to resign
Hans von Seeckt had headed the army command since 1920 and had built the 100,000-man Reichswehr under the Versailles limits. He was a monarchist who encouraged traditional links with the old Imperial Army, and that outlook lay behind the immediate cause of his fall: Hohenzollern Prince Wilhelm took part in a Reichswehr manoeuvre without the prior approval of the Defence Minister and the Reich President. A modern chronology dates his forced departure to 6 October and says it came at the insistence of Defence Minister Gessler and President Hindenburg, after relations had already soured over Seeckt's open opposition to the government's Locarno policy. The Paris dispatch in this paper offers a different emphasis, assuming that Hindenburg had tried to keep the general and that the cabinet's united stand behind the minister forced the resignation through. The paper's account and the later chronology agree on the outcome while differing on Hindenburg's role.
What Heye's appointment meant for civilian control of the army
The paper presents Wilhelm Heye as capable and politically colourless, and his career shows how closely he had followed Seeckt. He had commanded the 1st Division in Königsberg since November 1923, matching the post the article names, and on 9 October 1926 he once again succeeded Seeckt, as he had earlier done at the Troop Office. The Paris correspondent read the change as a gain for the republic, and later scholarship broadly supports that judgement in institutional terms: during Heye's tenure the army command lost much of the political influence it had held under Seeckt, while the authority of the Reichswehr Ministry grew. That shift strengthened the ministry, principally under Wilhelm Groener, the general the article recalls from 1918, and his protégé Kurt von Schleicher, but it moved power to ministry officers rather than to parliament.
Original
Verbotene Opposition.
Sonntag, 10. Oktober 1926. Verbotene Opposition. Das Politbureau tadelt Sinowjew und Trotzki, verlangt Unterwerfung und droht mit Sanktionen. Moskau, 9. Oktober. Der Konflikt der kommunistischen Parteien ist in ein entscheidendes Stadium getreten. Am 7. Oktober unternahm die Opposition organisierte Angriffe gegen das Zentralkomitee auf der Versammlung in Leningrad. Die heutigen Blätter melden überall eine Niederlage der Oppositionsführer. Im ganzen trat die Opposition auf 159 Versammlungen einzelner kommunistischer Kollektiven in Leningrad auf. Während das Zentralkomitee 33. 729 Stimmen erhieit, stimmten für die Opposition im ganzen 320. Die " Pravda " nimmt gegen die Opposition eine immer schärfere Stellung ein. Gleichzeitig ist Zeitungsnachrichten zu entnehmen, daß in kommunistischen Versammlungen einzelner Betriebe immer schärfere Resolutionen gegen die Opposition gefaßt werden. Das Blatt verlangt, daß die Opposition öffentlich vor der Partei und der kommunistischen Internationale ihre Tätigkeit in letzter Zeit einsieht und alle Angriffe und Verleumdungen gegen das Zentralkomitee zurücknimmt. Ohne diesen öffentlichen Schritt der Opposition sei keine Gewähr dafür vorhanden, daß in Zukunft derartige Krisen sich nicht wiederholen. Die Partei müsse alles unternehmen, um solchen Auswüchsen entgegenzutreten. Gleichzeitig werden heute die Beschlüsse des Politbureaus vom 4. und 8. Okdurch die führenden Vertreter der Opposition. Besondes schwer sei das Vorgehen Trotzkis und Sinowjews zu werten, da diese Personen nicht nur verantwortliche Beamte des Staates und Parteifunktionäre seien, sondern auch Mitglieder des Zentralkomitees und als solche die elementare Verpflichtung hätten, die Beschlüsse des Zentralkomitees zu verteidigen. Das Polytbureau beauftragt daher das Parteigericht und die Zentralkontrollkommission, eine Untersuchung der betreffenden Verfehlungen einzuleiten und überträgt die Frage der Sanktionen einer Sitzung des Plenums des Zentralkomitees und der Zentralkontrollkommission. Dieser Beschluß vom 4. Oktober war der Grund für die Gerüchte von einer Verständigung zwischen Opposition und Mehrheit, da allgemein angenommen worden ist, daß sich die Opposition diesem Beschluß unterwerfen wird. Die Kundgebung des Politbureaus vom 8. Oktober zeigt, daß die Fortsetzung der oppositionellen Kampagne selbst von der Leitung der Partei nicht erwartet worden ist. Trotz des Beschlusses vom 4. Oktober habe das Mitglied des Zentralkomitees Sinowjew
Rußland anerkennt die Amerika-Schuld
der Opposition sei keine Gewähr dafür vorhanden, daß in Zukunft derartige Krisen sich nicht wiederholen. Die Partei müsse alles unternehmen, um solchen Auswüchsen entgegenzutreten. Gleichzeitig werden heute die Beschlüsse des Politbureaus vom 4. und 8. Oktober publiziert. Der Beschluß vom 4. Oktober konstatiert eine schwere Verletzung der Parteidisziplin Die Kundgebung des Politbureaus vom 8. Oktober zeigt, daß die Fortsetzung der oppositionellen Kampagne selbst von der Leitung der Partei nicht erwartet worden ist. Trotz des Beschlusses vom 4. Oktober habe das Mitglied des Zentralkomitees Sinowjew am 7. Oktober wieder in Opposition zu dem Zentralkomitee diskreditierende Reden in der Zelle der Putilow-Werke in Leningrad gehalten. Rußland anerkennt die Amerika-Schuld Erklärung Krassins. London, 9. Oktober. Der neue Sowjetgesandte in London, Krassin, erklärte in einem Interview, daß die Sowjetregierung bereit sei, die amerikanischen Schulden, anzuerkennen, und daß, sobald Verhandlungen zwischen den Vereinigten Staaten und Rußland begonnen werden würden, diese in zwei Wochen zu einem befriedigenden Abschluß gebracht werden könnten. " Wir würden ", sagte Krassin, " nur eine Bedingung stellen, nämlich die, daß keine europäischen Forderungen in das Abkommen eingemischt würden. Auch würden wir dieselbe Großzügigkeit uns gegenüber erwarten, wie sie die Vereinigten Staaten ihren anderen Schuldnern gegenüber bewiesen hat. Auf die Frage, ob er glaube, daß Rußland geeignetste Moment dafür und er werde Chamberlain nicht auffordern, derartige Verhandlungen wieder aufzunehmen. Natürlich werde er darauf hinarbeiten, mit der englischen Regierung zu verhandeln. Die Sowjetregierung habe nur zwei Interessen im Auslande: 1. Frieden und 2. die Aufnahme ausländischer Kredite. Zwar könnte Rußland auch ohne fremde Hilfe seinen Wiederaufbau vollenden, aber es wolle schneller vorwärts kommen und das könne es nicht ohne fremde Kredite. Man habe der Sowjetregierung wiederholt gesagt, sie solle nur ihre Schulden anerkennen, dann würden die Kredite automatisch folgen. Das entspreche aber nicht den Tatsachen. Man brauche nur
Die Liquidierung des Falles Seeckt.
keine europäischen Forderungen in das Abkommen eingemischt würden. Auch würden wir dieselbe Großzügigkeit uns gegenüber erwarten, wie sie die Vereinigten Staaten ihren anderen Schuldnern gegenüber bewiesen hat. Auf die Frage, ob er glaube, daß Rußland Amerika einen unbegrenzten Markt für amerikanisches Kapital bieten werde, erwiderte Krassin, daß dies seiner Meinung nach der Fall sein werde; er glaube jedoch nicht, daß Amerika großes Interesse für fremde Märkte habe. Amerika benötige diese vorderhand nicht, sondern wahrscheinlich erst in 25 Jahren, und bis dahin würde Rußland sich ökonomisch auf demselben Niveau wie Amerika befinden. Krassin stellte in Abrede, daß er nach London gekommen sei, um dort Kredite zu erlangen. Er sagte, augenblicklich wäre der unHilfe seinen Wiederaufbau vollenden, aber es wolle schneller vorwärts kommen und das könne es nicht ohne fremde Kredite. Man habe der Sowjetregierung wiederholt gesagt, sie solle nur ihre Schulden anerkennen, dann würden die Kredite automatisch folgen. Das entspreche aber nicht den Tatsachen. Man brauche nur Belgien zu betrachten, das alle seine Schulden anerkannt hat und jetzt Kredite braucht, um seine Valuta zu stabilisieren und zu diesem Zwecke seine Eisenbahnen verpfänden muß, um wenigstens einen Teil von dem zu bekommen, was es braucht. Rußlands Politik besteht darin, diese beiden Fragen zu verknüpfen: Ohne Kredite könne die Sowjetregierung sich nicht verpflichten, seine fremden Schulden zu bezahlen. Es habe daher keinen Sinn, über derartige Bedingungen zu sprechen. Die Liquidierung des Falles Seeckt. Generalleutnant Heye zum Chef der Heeresleitung ernannt. Großer Eindruck in Paris. Berlin, 9. Oktober. Der Konflikt zwischen dem bisherigen Chef der Heeresleitung General von Seeckt und dem Reichswehrminister ist dadurch beendet worden, daß der Reichspräsident zum Nachfolger des zurückgetretenen Generalobersten den Generalleutnant Heye, bisherigen Kommandanten der ersten Division und Befehlshaber im östlichen Wehrkreis I in Königsberg, zum Chef der Heeresleitung ernannt hat. Heye gehört zu den befähigtesten Offizieren der Reichswehr. Er hat im Krieg verantwortungsvolle Stellungen innegehabt, so 1915 bei Iwangorod. Seinen klaren Blick bewies er auch, als er am Ende des Krieges im Auftrag des Generals Gröner den Armeeführern der Westfront ein zutreffendes Bild der verzweifelten militärischen Gesamtlage gab. Nach dem Kriege hat penamtes und des Personalamtes verwaltet. Politisch ist der neue Chef der Heeresleitung in den letzten Jahren fast gar nicht hervorgetreten. Paris, 9. Oktober. Die Genehmigung des Rücktrittes des Generals von Seeckt durch den Reichspräsidenten hat heute hier umso stärkeren Eindruck gemacht, als man angenommen hatte, daß die Bemühungen des Reichspräsidenten, den General zu halten, zu einem faulen Kompromiß führen würden. Die Entschiedenheit, mit der das gesamte Reichskabinett sich hinter den Wehrminister gestellt und dadurch die Annahme der Demission des Generals erzwungen hat, wird hier als ein erfreulicher Beweis für die Konsolidierung der republi -