L’Écho d’Alger
- M. Stresemann delivers a major speech on Franco-German understanding
- M. Briand met M. Austen Chamberlain yesterday at the Quai d'Orsay
- M. Herriot and the Poincaré Cabinet
L'Écho d'Alger of 3 October 1926 led its front page with the new diplomacy between France and Germany. Gustav Stresemann, the German foreign minister, called Franco-German understanding the "central point" of any European pacification. He expected to be called an eternal optimist and a trusting utopian, but argued that Germany's recovery could rest only on peace. From Paris, the paper printed the Quai d'Orsay's official note on Aristide Briand's meeting with Austen Chamberlain. According to the note, the two ministers examined Franco-German relations as organized by Locarno and Thoiry and found their understanding in the service of peace closer and more cordial than ever. The page also carried an interview in which Édouard Herriot defended his decision to join Poincaré's "government of financial defence" by citing the Jacobin tradition of putting country first. He remembered his speech at Geneva as the sweetest hour of his time as prime minister.
Translation
M. Stresemann delivers a major speech on Franco-German understanding
[?] Speaking of the understanding between France and Germany, M. Stresemann continued: "I know all the obstacles, all the psychological difficulties that exist, here and in France, but I do not believe anyone can dispute that Franco-German understanding is and remains the central point of any European pacification. This is not a question of tactics, but an essential problem of future development, without anyone being able to say, today [?] the peoples have the desire and the will of their statesmen.
"I believe in the sincere will for understanding of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs; I can already see myself treated as an eternal optimist and a trusting utopian. It is folly simply to have confidence in positive reasons, but it is also a complete error to believe that policy must be determined by mistrust alone.
"The old policy, 'Trust no one and deceive everyone,' was not, in the end, so fruitful in the past. For me, one thing is certain: the new Germany and its recovery can be based only on peace. It is the only foundation on which we can restore our strength.
"But how is this peace possible if it were not preceded by and based on Franco-German understanding?" [?]
M. Briand met M. Austen Chamberlain yesterday at the Quai d'Orsay
[?] Paris, October 2. — At the close of M. Briand's meeting with M. Chamberlain, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued the following note: MM. Briand and Chamberlain met this afternoon and held a meeting at the Quai d'Orsay, in the course of which they noted and defined their community of views and action for the solution of the international problems now before them.
M. Chamberlain, who had been informed in Geneva of his French colleague's intention to confer with the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, had had to leave Switzerland before the Thoiry meeting and had rested during a 15-day cruise in the Mediterranean. Before returning to London and resuming contact with the Foreign Office, he made a point of stopping in Paris to confer with the French Minister of Foreign Affairs.
The two statesmen examined the external situation, in particular Franco-German relations, whose organization the Locarno agreements and the Thoiry conversations have defined. The conversation continued in the favorable atmosphere ensured by personal relations, and the two ministers were able to note that their understanding in the service of peace remains closer and more cordial than ever.
Statements by M. Briand to the Press
Paris, October 2. — [?]
M. Herriot and the Poincaré Cabinet
[?] — "At a time when some reproach you so bitterly for having entered the Poincaré cabinet, would you tell me what thought guided you in granting it your collaboration?" Such was the question M. Joseph Beineix, of Paris-Midi, put to M. Herriot.
My collaboration in the Poincaré Cabinet
— I have merely followed the old Jacobin tradition which holds that in hours of peril one tries to rise above oneself and devote oneself wholly to the salvation of the fatherland, the supreme law. That spirit, which I did not always find in all those to whom I had to turn in certain circumstances, I tried to make my own when M. Poincaré asked for my help. I did not change my ideas to enter a ministry of this or that shade. I kept my ideas in order to collaborate in a government of financial defense that is trying to restore the vital parts of the country. Ready to return, if need be, to the humblest rank in my party, I remain closely faithful to it. But that fidelity does not forbid me; on the contrary, it commands me to put my country above everything. Before all else, I am French.
— You have twice been President of the Council. What was the cruelest hour, and what was the sweetest hour, of your premierships?
— My saddest memory (M. Herriot pauses) I will not tell you today. The events are still too recent. Come and ask me later. The sweetest hour was that of my speech at Geneva where, as the representative of France, I had the true face of my country and its will for peace applauded by the delegates of fifty-two nations. [?]
Context
Why Stresemann expected to be mocked at home
Stresemann expected to be called an "eternal optimist" and a "trusting utopian." He had good reason. He had founded and led the German People's Party, which brought together the right wing of the old National Liberals and some of the Progressives. By the mid-1920s, the conservative opposition attacked him for supporting the Republic and fulfilling the demands of the Western powers. Even inside his own party, some of the more conservative members never really trusted him. That is why this passage defends trust so hard. He was not claiming that mistrust is always wrong. He was saying that policy based only on mistrust, the old rule of "trust no one and deceive everyone," had not paid off. He also presented understanding with France as the precondition for restoring Germany's own strength, tying the case for trust to national recovery.
What Germany hoped to gain from rapprochement
In the speech, peace is the foundation on which Germany can "restore our strength." Accounts of Stresemann's diplomacy describe the goals behind it in hard terms. Stresemann was not in any sense pro-French. His main aim was to free Germany from the burden of reparations payments to France, and he also wanted all foreign troops out of the occupied Rhineland. The historian Hans Mommsen sums up Stresemann's own verdict: Locarno was no more than a first step toward the "gradual reacquisition of German sovereignty through a network of European treaties." By the time of this speech, that method was working. In September 1926, the month before, Germany had been admitted to the League of Nations as a permanent member of its Council. Stresemann and Briand's work on Locarno was also recognized with the 1926 Nobel Peace Prize, which they shared. In 1930 the last occupying troops left the Rhineland, five years earlier than the Treaty of Versailles required. The speech's language of trust and its concern for German power therefore belonged to the same strategy.
Britain's place in Franco-German diplomacy after Locarno
The French communiqué stressed that Chamberlain had been told in Geneva of Briand's intention to confer with Stresemann, and it said the two ministers' understanding in the service of peace remained "closer and more cordial than ever." There was a reason Britain needed to be kept informed. In the main Locarno treaty, Britain was one of the powers guaranteeing the inviolability of the Franco-German and German-Belgian borders. If the League of Nations determined that a breach had occurred, the other signatories were to assist the country against which the violation had taken place. Chamberlain also had his own reasons to welcome Franco-German talks. He hoped that if relations between France and Germany improved, France would gradually abandon its cordon sanitaire, the ring of alliances with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia on Germany's eastern side. Briand had returned to the Quai d'Orsay in 1925 and would remain foreign minister until 1932. The note's reference to Locarno and Thoiry therefore presented the bilateral talks as part of the same framework as the treaty Britain guaranteed, not as a way around it.
Why Herriot's seat in Poincaré's cabinet drew bitter criticism
The reproaches the interviewer mentions make sense in light of Herriot's recent past. Herriot had led the first Cartel des Gauches, the left-wing coalition that defeated Poincaré's government in the 1924 elections. According to one assessment, Poincaré lost that election more because of the franc's collapse and the taxes that followed than because of diplomatic isolation. In July 1926, Herriot's own second ministry lasted only a few days, from the 19th to the 23rd. Poincaré then began a third premiership, which lasted from 1926 to 1929, and brought Herriot in as minister of education, a post he held until 1928. Herriot had been president of the Radical Party since 1919; the list of his offices gives 1926 as the end of that first term. That background gives weight to his statement that he was ready to return to "the humblest rank" in his party while remaining faithful to it. His defence rests on two things. One is patriotic duty in a financial emergency. The other is the claim that he kept his ideas while serving alongside his old opponent.
Original
M. Stresemann prononce un grand discours sur l'entente franco-allemande
[?] Parlant de l'entente entre la France et l'Allemagne, M. Stresemann poursuit: «Je connais tous les obstacles, toutes les difficultés psychologiques qui existent, ici et en France, mais je ne crois pas qu'on puisse contester que l'entente franco-allemande est et reste le point central de toute pacification européenne. Il ne s'agit pas, ici, d'une question de tactique, mais d'un problème essentiel d'évolution future, sans que personne puisse dire, aujourd'hui [?] les peuples ont le désir et la volonté de leurs hommes d'Etat. «Je crois en la loyale volonté d'entente du ministre français des Affaires Etrangères; Je me vois déjà traité d'éternel optimiste et d'utopiste confiant. C'est une folie que d'avoir simplement confiance dans des raisons positives, mais c'est une complète erreur aussi de croire que la politique ne doit être déterminée que par la méfiance. «L'ancienne politique: «N'aie confiance en personne et trompe tout le monde» n'a pas finalement été si féconde dans le passé. Pour moi, la chose est certaine, la nouvelle Allemagne et son relèvement ne peuvent être basés que sur la paix. C'est la seule base sur laquelle nous pouvons rétablir notre force. «Mais comment cette paix est-elle possible si elle n'était pas précédée et basée sur l'entente franco-allemande?» [?]
M. Briand a eu hier, au Quai d’Orsay, une entrevue avec M. Austen Chamberlain
[?] Paris, 2 octobre. - A l'issue de l'entrevue de M. Briand avec M. Chamberlain, le ministère des affaires étrangères a communiqué la note suivante: MM. Briand et Chamberlain se sont rencontrés cet après-midi, et ont eu une entrevue au Quai d'Orsay au cours de laquelle ils ont constaté et précisé leur communauté de vues et d'action pour la solution des problèmes internationaux actuellement posés. M. Chamberlain qui, à Genève, avait été mis au courant des intentions de son collègue français de s'entretenir avec le Ministre des affaires étrangères allemand, avait dû quitter la Suisse avant l'entrevue de Thoiry et s'était reposé au cours d'une croisière de 15 jours dans la Méditerranée. Avant de rentrer à Londres et reprendre contact avec le Foreign Office il a tenu à s'arrêter à Paris pour s'entretenir avec le Ministre des Affaires étrangères français. Les deux hommes d'Etat ont examiné la situation extérieure, en particulier les relations franco-allemandes, dont les accords de Locarno et les conversations de Thoiry ont précisé l'organisation. La conversation s'est poursuivie dans l'atmosphère favorable qu'assurent des relations personnelles et les deux ministres ont pu constater que leur entente au service de la paix reste plus étroite et plus cordiale que jamais. Déclarations de M. Briand à la Presse Paris, 2 octobre. - [?]
M. Herriot et le Cabinet Poincaré
[?] - «A l'heure où certains vous reprochent si âprement d'être entré dans le cabinet Poincaré, voulez-vous me dire à quelle pensée vous avez obéi en lui accordant votre collaboration?» telle est la question que M. Joseph Beineix, de Paris-Midi, a posée à M. Herriot. Ma collaboration au Cabinet Poincaré - Je n'ai fait que suivre la vieille tradition jacobine qui veut qu'aux heures de péril, on tâche de s'élever au-dessus de soi-même et de se dévouer tout entier au salut de la patrie, loi suprême. L'esprit que je n'ai pas toujours trouvé chez tous ceux auxquels j'eus à m'adresser en certaines circonstances, j'ai essayé de m'en pénétrer quand M. Poincaré m'a demandé mon concours. Je n'ai pas changé mes idées pour entrer dans un ministère de telle ou telle nuance. J'ai gardé mes idées pour collaborer à un gouvernement de défense financière qui essaye de restaurer les œuvres vives du pays. Prêt à reprendre, s'il le faut, le rang le plus modeste dans mon parti, je lui reste étroitement fidèle. Mais cette fidélité ne m'interdit pas, elle me commande au contraire de mettre au-dessus de tout mon pays. Avant tout, je suis Français. - Vous avez été deux fois président du Conseil. Quelle fut l'heure la plus cruelle, quelle fut l'heure la plus douce de vos présidences? - Mon souvenir le plus triste (M. Herriot marque un temps), je ne vous le dirai pas aujourd'hui. Les événements sont encore trop récents. Venez m'interroger plus tard. L'heure la plus douce, ce fut celle de mon discours à Genève où, représentant de la France, je fis applaudir le vrai visage de mon pays et sa volonté de paix par les délégués de cinquante-deux nations. [?]